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The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

6 August 1984  
NIC #04486-84

Att. ER 84-2693+11  
DDO 84-1015

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: David D. Gries  
National Intelligence Officer for Narcotics

SUBJECT: NNBIS Coordinating Board Meeting of 2 August 1984

1. Admiral Murphy presented an overview of improved NNBIS cooperation, including a meeting which he alleged had ironed out difficulties between himself and Mullen. He also noted that intelligence reaching NNBIS was better than ever.

2. Schowengerdt, who runs the NNBIS Center in Washington, followed with a viewgraph presentation on the Joint Surveillance Committee report. The issues of concern to the Intelligence Community include:

- Threat Assessment: Interdiction remains at a low level, in part because of inadequate intelligence.
- Detection: Unlike the Intelligence Community, the law enforcement community uses little secure communications gear; hence, DEA, Coast Guard, and Customs must upgrade their voice privacy nets to prevent traffickers from listening in. Surface-bound radar in ships and on land has limited detection potential. What is needed are more aerostats and look-down, airborne radar.
- Deterrence: Little intelligence interest here. The domestic agencies are struggling to tighten federal laws and regulations that greatly hamper their deterrence operations.

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- Reaction: Poor detection, in part reflecting inadequate intelligence, delays or defeats reaction by interdiction assets.
- Conclusions: Low success has been achieved against a high threat. Interdiction assets are used inefficiently, and detection assets (AWACS) borrowed from DOD cannot be greatly increased. Border interdiction is only one aspect, but an important one, of federal strategy against druggers.
- Recommendations: The interdiction effort should emphasize air over sea detection--the current mix of responsibilities by agency is satisfactory--aerial surveillance of traffickers at the borders must be enhanced--better intelligence on traffickers is needed--the focus should be on South and Central America, not on the Near East and Asia--a Central Command Center should be established to handle intelligence flowing from detection efforts and to feed reaction assets.
- Options for Enhancement: Four options for improved border interdiction were presented--Murphy backs Option B, which calls for a \$145 million package of additional aerostats and P3A aircraft, but no enhancement of ships and planes available to Customs and Coast Guard to react to traffickers detected by increased surveillance--other options range from doing nothing to increasing both aerial surveillance and Customs and Coast Guard reaction assets.

3. During the ensuing discussion, positions were staked out as follows:

- Customs said it didn't have the ships and planes to arrest more druggers.
- DEA did not want agencies to reprogram money from other drug programs to border interdiction.
- OMB wondered who was going to pay.
- FBI was concerned that reprogramming within agencies would simply take away from other worthwhile programs.

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-- Treasury, alone among those agencies represented, refused to coordinate on the Joint Surveillance Committee Report, unless the report made a recommendation as to which agencies would pay for what--the real issue here is that McNamara and Murphy have locked horns for some time over who would pay for five additional P3As that Customs wants. McNamara wants DOD to pay, Murphy wants Treasury to pay.

4. Murphy will present the study to the Executive Board next week, with the general concurrence of all except Treasury, but with the report modified to take account of the points made in the discussion above. Since the Intelligence Community is a major player only in the threat portion of the report, I made no comment and presume our concurrence is taken for granted. Note: We should watch the Central Command Center idea. If it relates only to border interdiction, it might be useful, but command centers have a way of growing.



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